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This Article summarizes important developments during 2016 relating to
international mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures in Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United
States.
I.

Brazil

A.

PRIVATE

EQUITY

INVESTMENT

FUNDs (FIPs)

The Brazilian Comissio de Valores Mobiliirios ("CVM"), the equivalent
of the American Securities and Exchange Commission, issued on August 30,
2016, Instruction no. 578' (ICVM 578), which regulates the formation,
operation, and management of Private Equity Investment Funds (FIPs).2
Foreigners investing in Brazil use FIPs for various reasons, including
taxation. Before issuing ICVM 578, CVM held public hearings. CVM's
Superintendent of Market Development, Antonio Berwanger, stated that
"[t]he public hearing process generated an ample discussion with market
players and brought important modifications to the final text of the ruling,
which bring local regulations to a greater proximity with those
* Brazil-Renata Antiquera, who also served as Committee Editor, is a partner and
Alexandre Bevak David is a founding partner of David, Aniceto, Stievano, Bosschart, Antiquera
e Almendro Advogados Associados. Canada-Gordon Cameron is a principal and Elyse Velagic
is an associate at the New York offices of Stikeman Elliott Law Firm. Chile-Mr. Francisco
Ugarte is a partner of Carey Abogados, where Mr. Luciano Aguilera is an associate.
Germany-Dr. Hermann J. Knott, is a partner of Luther's Cologne office. Italy-Alessandra
Tarissi de Jacobis and Claudio Corba Colombo are partners of De Berti, Jacchia, Franchini,
Forlani Studio Legale. Netherlands-Eva Das is a partner at Stibbe's New York office and
Frederik de Hosson is an associate at Stibbe's Amsterdam office. Russia-Vassily Rudomino is
a senior partner and Anton Dzhuplin is a partner of Alrud Law Firm. Saudi Arabia-Amgad T.
Husein is the managing partner of Denton's Riyadh's office where Jonathan Burns is an
associate. United States-Adrienne Ellman is an associate, and Joseph J. Basile is a partner of

Foley Hoag LLP in Boston.
1. ICVM No. 578, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAo [D.O.U], 08.31.2016, 1 (Braz.).
2. Id.
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internationally practiced, and aim to reflect more adequately market's
operational reality."3 Summarized below are some aspects of ICVM 578
with the most impact on the M&A market in Brazil and elsewhere.
1.

FIP Investments in Limited Liability Companies

This is one of the most sought-after improvements of ICVM 578.
Previously, FIPs were not allowed to invest in limited liability companies,
one of the most common corporate forms in Brazil. That restriction either
impeded acquisitions entirely or required a time and money consuming
corporate reorganization of the target company.
Generally, under ICVM 578, in order for a FIP to invest in a limited
liability company: (1) the FIP must participate in the decision-making
process of the target limited liability company, effectively influencing its
management and strategic policy, according to one of the methods listed in
Article 6 of ICVM 578 and (2) the target limited liability company may have
an annual gross revenue of up to BRL 300 million, depending on the
investing FIP's classification.4 There are exceptions to the participation in
the decision-making process requirement. Under Article 6 of ICVM 578, a
FIP is not required to participate in the decision-making process of the
target limited liability company when (1) the FIP's investment in the
company is reduced to less than half the percentage originally invested and
represents less than 15 percent of the capital of the invested company or (2)
the book value of the investment has been reduced to zero and, during a
general shareholders' meeting, a majority of the subscribed units present
vote to waive the requirement (unless a higher quorum is required by the
FIP's regulations). Article 7 of ICVM 578 outlines other situations in which
a FIP's participation in the decision-making process of the target limited
liability company is not required.
2.

FIPInvestments in Foreign Assets

ICVM 578 also alters when FIPs may invest in foreign assets. For the
purposes of ICVM 578, foreign assets are those assets whose issuer, at the
moment the investment is made, is (1) headquartered outside Brazil or (2)
headquartered in Brazil with assets located abroad corresponding to 50
percent or more of the total assets in its financial statements. A FIP may
invest, directly or indirectly, in foreign assets up to the limitation of 20
percent of its subscribed capital, provided that (1) the assets are of the same
economic nature as the eligible assets located in Brazil and (2) the FIP
effectively influences the decision-making process of the foreign entity. In
addition, a "multi-strategy" FIP offered exclusively to professional investors,
as defined by legislation,5 may invest up to the totality of its subscribed
3. See CVM edita normas sobrefundos de private equity, ComissAo DiE VALORES MOBILIARIOS
(Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.cvm.gov.br/noticias/arquivos/2016/20160830-2.html.
4. See ICVM No. 578, art. 14, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAo [D.O.], 08.31.2016, 1 (Braz.).
5. See ICVM No. 554, art. 9, DIARIO OFIcIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U], 12.17.2014, 7 (Braz.).
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capital in foreign assets in certain circumstances such as if: (1) its regulation
expressly allows it; (2) its regulation explicitly contemplates the exclusive
participation of professional investors; and (3) the expression "Investimento
no Exterior" ("Overseas Investment") is included in the FIP's name.
3.

FIPAdvances for Future CapitalIncrease (AFAC)

To the pleasure of players in the markets, ICVM 578 allows FIPs to make
advances for future capital increase (AFACs) in their invested companies. A
FIP may now make advances for future capital increase in publicly or
privately held corporations that are included in its portfolio, provided that
(1) at the time of the AFAC, the FIP was already a shareholder of the
company; (2) the FIP's regulations expressly provide for AFACs and specify
the subscribed capital that can be used for making the advance; (3) any form
of repentance of the advance by the FIPs is prohibited; and (4) the advance is
converted into capital increase within twelve months.
B.

EXPEDITED LEGALIZATION OF FOREIGN PUBLIc

DOCUMENTS

Also in 2016, Brazil's enactment of the Hague Convention Abolishing the
Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public Documents became
effective.6 This change means that Brazilians abroad or foreigners within
Brazil may use public documents quicker and for less money. It also means
more efficiency and legal certainty for transactions that depend directly or
indirectly on public documents, such as M&A.
H.

Canada

On June 8, 2016, Bill 218, the Burden Reduction Act, 2016, passed the
first reading in the Ontario legislature.7 If enacted, Bill 218 would repeal
Ontario's 99-year-old Bulk Sales Act (Act) and also modernize certain laws
affecting Ontario business and commercial practice. Although the majority
of Canadian jurisdictions have repealed similar statutes, Ontario (home to
Canada's largest commercial center, Toronto) is the last Canadian commonlaw jurisdiction to maintain its bulk sales legislation. There is hope within
the Ontario legal and business community that Royal Assent to Bill 218 will
be received in this legislative session.
Historically, the Act was intended to protect creditors against the effect of
an undisclosed (though valid) sale of all or substantially all of their debtors'
assets and the possible unfair distribution or disbursement of the proceeds.8
But because the Act applies to all bulk asset sales9 in Ontario, regardless of
6. See Decreto No 8.660, de 29 de Janeiro de 2016, Dimuo OFICIAL DA UNIAo [D.O.U.] de
1.29.2016 (Braz.).
7. Burden Reduction Act, 2016, S.O. 2016 (Can.).
8. Cieslok Media Ltd. v. Clarity Outdoor Media Inc. [2016] 129 O.R. 3d 589, para 10 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
9. Bulk Sales Act, R.S.O. 1990, c B.14, s. 2 (Can).
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whether the seller is solvent or not, it is significantly flawed. As a result of
the Act's wide-reaching application, as early as 1950, the Canadian legal
community noted that such undifferentiating compliance is onerous in
commercial M&A transactions that are structured as asset deals.o
To comply with the Act, a purchaser of assets in Ontario must request and
receive from the seller, and the seller is required to deliver to the purchaser a
statement of creditors verified by affidavit." Complying with the Act can be
expensive and time-consuming, and accordingly asset-transaction parties
often rely on compliance waivers and indemnities from failure to comply as a
practical solution. Yet Ontario courts have been clear that waivers do not
exempt sales of assets from the application of the Act.12 As recently as 2016,
in Cieslok Media Ltd. v. Clarity Outdoor Media Inc., the Ontario Superior
Court acknowledged that other provinces have repealed their bulk sales
legislation in favor of something less onerous,' 3 and observed that in Ontario
the Act is still law and lacks a mechanism for parties to waive its
requirements. 14
While a seller may ask a court to exempt a sale from the Act,5 the cost and
time involved makes such applications burdensome and rare. But failure to
comply with the Act can have significant consequences, as the Act allows
courts to unwind a transaction and impose personal liability on a
purchaser. 16
Once Bill 218 receives Royal Assent, parties to asset deals or acquisition
financings with assets located in Ontario will see a decrease of legal costs and
deal risks. Having passed the first reading, on June 8, 2016, Bill 218 was
referred to a committee of the legislature for further review before being
voted on and passed into law at a later point in the current legislative session.

M.

Chile

For the past two years, the Chilean economy has suffered a deceleration
due partly to the end of the commodities super cycle. In 2015 M&A activity
in Chile substantially decreased.'7 But this year, M&A activity in Chile has
made an impressive comeback with transactions totaling over USD 20
billion. This rise is partially due to the favorable USD/CLP exchange rate
and the conclusion of various government reforms.'s Also, many
10. Fred M. Catzman, Q.C. "The Bulk Sales Act (Ontario)", 1 Can. Bar J. 38.
11. Supra note 9, at § 4.
12. Cieslok Media Ltd. 129 OR. 3d. at para. 12.
13. Id. at para. 10.
14. Id. at para. 13.
15. Supra note 9, at § 3(1).
16. Id. at § 16(1).
17. Ximena Celed6n, Transaccionesde M&A en mercado chileno cayeron casi un 60% durante 2015,
PuLso Gan. 25, 2016), http://static.pulso.cl/20160124/2245065.pdf.
18. Fusionesy adquisiciones aumentan 19% en America Latina a octubre, DIARIO FINANCIERO
(Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.df.cl/noticias/mercados/mercados-en-accioni/fusiones-yadquisiciones-aumentan-19-en-america-latina-a-octubre/2016-11-14/195347.html.
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international rankings still consider Chile strong with respect to perceived
corruption and investment opportunities in the region.'9

A.

AMENDMENTS TO THE CHILEAN COMPETITION STATUE

On August 30, 2016, Law Decree No. 211 (the Chilean Competition
Statute) was amended by Law No. 20, 945.20 Changes included redefining
the standard of collusion and introducing applicable criminal penalties and
mandatory consultation for certain mergers and acquisitions before the
competent authority.21

Concentration transactions that exceed certain thresholds determined by
the National Economic Prosecutor (FiscaliaNacional Economica or FNE) are
now subject to mandatory reporting. Concentration transactions are defined
as any event, act, agreement, or combination thereof that cuts off an
economic agent's independence. This includes mergers and direct or
indirect acquisitions that allow the purchaser to exercise a decisive influence
in the management of the competitor, joint ventures that form an
independent economic agent, and acquisitions of the control of competitors'
assets.
If applicable thresholds are met, the concentration transaction must be
reported to and approved by the FNE. The transaction is suspended during
FNE consideration. Within thirty days after the concentration transaction
has been reported, the FNE must either (1) unconditionally approve the
transaction, if convinced that the transaction does not substantially reduce
competition; (2) approve the transaction provided that certain conditions are
complied with, if convinced that the transaction does not substantially
reduce competition; or (3) extend the investigation for an additional ninetyday period in order to gather more information. If the FNE remains silent
after the expiration of the thirty-day period, the transaction is deemed
approved. On the other hand, if the FNE has extended the investigation,
upon the expiration of the investigation term, the FNE must affirmatively
act, either approving the transaction (conditionally or unconditionally) or
prohibiting it.
The amendment to the Chilean Competition Statue will probably delay
closing of many future M&A transactions. But merger-control ultimately
will benefit free-market competition, finally adapting Chilean practice to
international standards.

19. See 2015-2016 Scorecard, LAVCA (2016), https://lavca.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/ll/
UPDATED-FINAL-Scorecard-15-16.pdf.
20. Chile: Competition Law Amendments, GUERRERO OLIvos, http://www.guerrero.cl/prontus
12
125459.html.
guerrero/site/artic/20161012/pags/201610
2 1. Id.
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COURT OF APPEAL HOLDS THAT MERGERS ARE RELATED-

PARTY TRANSACTIONS
On March 22, 2016, the Court of Appeals of Santiago held that mergers
qualify as related-party transactions and are, thus, subject to the provisions
of Title XVI (Related Party Transactions) of the Corporations Act, Law No.
18,046.22 Title XVI applies to "any" transaction with a related party. In
light of that wording, the Court determined that a related-party transaction
is a broad and universal concept and, as such, does not exclude mergers. As a
result, before shareholder approval of a merger, the requirements and
procedures applicable to related-party transactions must be satisfied with
respect to each merging entity. This decision came after the Chilean
Securities and Insurance Commission had held, in light of the corporate
reorganization of a leading electric company, that mergers of corporations
(sociedades anonimas) were not related-party transactions, and consequently,
were not subject to Title XVI of the Corporations Act.23

C.

EXPEDITED LEGALIZATION OF FOREIGN PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

As of August 30, 2016, Chile finally became a member of The Hague
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public
Documents,24 doing away with the red tape previously required in
connection with these documents. Foreign documents-such as powers of
attorney, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and certificates of good
standing-no longer require a lengthy legalization process, because a simple
apostille will suffice. As soon as a competent authority affixes an apostille to
the foreign document, the document is valid in Chile. Likewise, if
documents issued in Chile are apostilled, then they will be valid in all other
Member States to The Hague Convention.

IV.
A.

GERMANY
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS

In Q1 through Q3 2016, Germany has attracted 599 deals worth EUR
51.Obn, a 13.3 % increase by value over the same period of 2015 (610 deals,
EUR 45.Obn). "Industrials & Chemicals" was the most coveted sector by
value, with 207 deals worth EUR 18.2bn increasing 30.4 percent compared

to the same period of 2015 (186 deals, EUR 13.9bn).25 In 2016 the crossborder activities of German companies have significantly increased, the best
22. Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago [C. Apel.] [Court of Appeals of Santiago], 20 julio 2015,
"Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones Habitat S.A c. Superintendencia de Valores y
Seguros," Rol de la causa: 8,069-2015 (Chile).
23. Letter from Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros to Gerente General No.15443 (uly
20, 2015), available at http://www.svs.cl/documentos/ofo/ofo_15443 2015.xml.
24. Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents,
Oct. 5, 1961, T.I.A.S. No 10072, 33 U.S.T. 883.
25. Mergermarket trend report Q1-Q3 2016 for Germany.
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illustration being the EUR 58.2bn takeover of Monsanto by Bayer,26 which
is still awaiting antitrust clearance.
China continues to invest heavily in Germany, with twenty-six deals worth
EUR 8.8bn prompting some critics to describe this phenomenon as the sell27
The reality appears to be more nuanced.
out of the German economy.

Although some "black sheep" may try to enter the German market, seriousminded Chinese investors pursue a clear long-term strategy: they are willing
to invest in research and development activities and jobs in order to be able
to rely on technology "Made in Germany."
Another deal driver has been domestic restructuring like the carve-out of
the conventional energy generation division from E.ON into Uniper. The
UK's Brexit-vote is likely to cause foreign investors to divert their
investments to the continent, potentially increasing German inbound M&A,
although the weak pound may cause some opportunistic deals in the UK.

B.

IMPUTATION OF DIRECTORS' MISCONDUCT IN

Buy-OuTs

A recent decision of the Higher District Court of Dusseldorf,28 which is
on appeal with the Federal Supreme Court, addresses the imputation of
knowledge and misconduct of a target's managing directors in a
management buy-out situation. Following the buyer's acquisition of all
shares in several targets, two managing directors of the targets became
shareholders of the buyer and one of them was appointed managing director
of the buyer. Six months after the transaction, two targets had to file for
insolvency proceedings. It was discovered that the two aforementioned
managing directors knowingly had manipulated the balance sheets of the
now-insolvent targets. The buyer sued the seller, seeking damages and
rescission of the acquisition agreement on the basis of pre-contractual
liability. The Higher District Court of Dusseldorf ruled in favor of the
buyer, reasoning that the two managing directors had to be considered as
agents (Erfilllungsgehilfen)of the seller. Therefore, their manipulations were
imputable to the seller, at least in so far as the seller had based its actions on
the documents that the directors had prepared during SPA negotiations.29
Another issue was whether the buyer's claims should be precluded because
knowledge of the manipulations was imputable to the buyer. The Court
held that the buyer's claims were not precluded because the parties had
agreed in the SPA that any imputation of knowledge applied only to
independent guarantees and not to pre-contractual liability. Buyers should
26. Bayer confirms $66bn Monsanto takeover, BBC NEWS (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/

news/business-37361 556.
27. See M&A Review 10/2016, p. V.
28. Oberlandesgericht Diisseldorf [Higher District Court of Duseldorfj, 1-6 U 20/15,June 16,
2016 (Ger.).
29. See id. (German contract law allows for the exclusion of liability for the willful behavior of
auxiliary persons).
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seek to structure SPAs to exclude such imputation in as far-reaching terms as
possible.
In light of this decision, the German M&A community has focused on
best practices for drafting of contractual indemnity clauses in the context of
M&A agreements. Such clauses should address the start date and the
duration of the limitation period because there is a risk that the
indemnification claim may be time-barred before the third-party claim
against the target is due. One drafting solution is a time limitation that is
dependent on the timeline for a third-party claim, in particular the buyer's
(the indemnified party) notification to the seller (the indemnifying party) of
a third-party claim: "Any indemnification claim pursuant to this clause shall
be time-barred upon expiration of a period of . .. years after the purchaser
has become aware of the facts giving rise to the claim."30

V.

Italy

An issue that frequently arises at the decision stage of drafting SPAs is
whether the target company (or its subsidiaries), instead of the purchaser,
may be the beneficiary of an indemnity clause. Traditionally, target
companies could not be indemnified in SPAs for the following reasons: (1)
the parties to an SPA generally did not want to grant target companies any
rights; (2) target companies were not subject to the arbitration clause of
SPAs that would apply to the contractual parties; and (3) it might not be
possible to compensate target companies under an indemnity clause if the
purchase price had not yet been paid. Supporters of this approach refer to
an old Italian case31 in which the Supreme Court stated that, in similar cases,
article 1411 of the Italian Civil Code, regulating the "agreement in favor of
third parties," does not apply.32 Therefore, a third party (e.g., the target
company) cannot be identified as the beneficiary of an indemnity clause in
an SPA.
On the other hand, others note that the Court did not expressly prohibit
such indemnity clauses in SPAs. Those commentators suggest that a targetcompany indemnity clause might be qualified as a special arrangement in
favor of a third party with internal effects between the contractual parties
("contratto a favore di terzi con efficacia interna" or "contratto con prestazione al
terzo").33 According to this interpretation, the indemnity in favor of the
target company takes effect, not from and by virtue of the agreement, but
rather by its performance. This means that the parties to the SPA are
obligated only vis-t-vis each other, but they can decide to grant the target
company indemnity in accordance with the provisions of the indemnity
clause.
30. Hilgard, BB 2016, p. 1218, 1233.
31. Italian Supreme Court (Cassazione civile), May 27th 1985, no. 2155, Foro italiano, 1987, 1,
3124/3129.
32. Id.
33. See TARTAGLIA, Acquisto di quote societarie e pacchetti azionari, Maggioli, 2014, 114.
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Now, however, the Court of Milan has made clear that tortured reasoning
is not necessary. In a case issued on November 27, 2015,34 the Court clearly
stated that an indemnity clause that expressly identifies the target company
as an indemnity beneficiary shall be admitted under Italian Law and will be
governed by the provisions of Article 1411 of the Italian Civil Code. In light
of that decision, the validity of target-company indemnity clauses cannot be
denied any more. Further discussions, if any, might arise only on its exact
legal qualification.
In light of this development, when drafting this type of clause, attention
should be paid in order to (1) make clear and explicit the will of the parties
to grant an "advantage" to the target company (or, should that be the case,
its subsidiaries) and (2) make the granting of the indemnity to the target
company, in any case, subject to the request of the purchaser party.
VI.

Netherlands

During the negotiations of a public takeover, parties must attend to the
managing of inside information and to ensuring compliance with the
applicable rules on disclosure of inside information. A new European
market-abuse regime entered into force on July 3, 2016.35 The new
European rules on market abuse are primarily documented in the regulation
on market abuses6 (the "Regulation") and the new directive on market
abuse37 (the "Directive"). The new European market- abuse regime aims to
keep pace with market developments and to strengthen regulators'
investigative and sanctioning powers, and repeals the market abuse directive
from 2003.38 The new European market abuse regime entails certain
changes for the Netherlands, including (1) the rules on the publication of
inside information and (2) the administrative fines that can be imposed in
case of infringement.
The now-repealed Dutch market-abuse rules required listed companies to
publish inside information as soon as possible.39 Listed companies were,
however, allowed to delay the disclosure of such information if, and only if,
three cumulative requirements were met. 0 The Regulation, in principle,
comprises the same requirements for delaying the publication of inside
information. Under the regulation, listed companies may delay disclosure if
(1) disclosure would likely prejudice legitimate interests of the listed
company, (2) delay is not likely to mislead the public, and (3) confidentiality
34. Court of Milan, November 27th 2015, no. 13407, retrieved on the database https://www
.iusexplorer.it. The Court has been partially preceded by other decisions of Italian Local
Courts; see Court of Salerno, March 6th 2013, and Court of Appeal of Rome, June 3rd 2008.
35. See Commission Regulation 596/2014, 2014 OJ. (L 173) (EU).
36. See Commission Regulation 596/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 173) (EU).
37. See Council Directive 2014/57, art. 2, 2014 O.J. (L 173)(EU).
38. See Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) (EC).
39. Wet op her financieel toezicht, Sep. 28 2006, Stb. 2007 (Neth.).
40. See generally id.
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can be ensured.41 The regulation, however, introduces certain additional
administrative requirements. Under the new regime, listed companies must
(1) notify the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit
Financiele Markten) of the delay immediately after the information is
disclosed to the public42 and (2) keep a record of the date and time when the
inside information first existed, the moment when the decision to delay was
taken, who was responsible for the decision, and evidence supporting each
condition for the delay.43
The new market-abuse regime also imposes tougher administrative
sanctions on a listed company that violates the rules on the publication of
inside information. In particular, the administrative fines for serious
infringements have been raised in the Netherlands. The base amount for
administrative fines for serious infringements has been raised from EUR 2
million to EUR 2.5 million and the maximum fine from FUR 4 million to
EUR 5 million.44 As a result, the maximum fine for repeat infringements is
now EUR 20 million,45 provided that a maximum fine of up to 15% of net
annual turnover has been introduced for large enterprises.46 The AFM also
has the power to impose a fine of three times the profits gained or losses
avoided by an infringement.47
VII.

Russia

In Russia, recent developments in civil law, arbitration reform, and
litigation procedure are likely to affect the Russian M&A market. Global
tendencies, economic sanctions imposed on Russia, and depreciation of the
Russian Ruble have resulted in an acute need for the Russian economy to
access new financial markets, increase in incoming external investments,
improve the investment climate, and increase the number of internal M&A
deals. In that context, a set of amendments mainly aimed at liberalization of
the national legal system was introduced into the Russian legal system.
During the previous year, the Russian legislature adopted a number of
principles and mechanisms generally used in many other jurisdictions.

A.

CONTRACT LAW AMENDMENTS TO THE CIVIL CODE

The newly amended Russian Civil Code includes many changes in the
area of contract law. The principle of good faith has been elevated above all
41. See generally id.
42. See generally id.
43. See Commission Implementing Regulation 2016/1055, 2016 OJ. (L173) (EU).
44. FinancialMarkets in brief-new regulation and other developments, DF BPmuw BLACKSTONE
WESTBROEK (july 13, 2016), http://www.debrauw.com/newsletter/financial-markets-brief-new-

regulation-developments-3/#.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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other contractual provisions.48 As part of implementation of this principle,
new legislation prohibits parties from entering into any negotiations without
serious intentions and provides remedies for a party's groundless withdrawal
from negotiations.49
Several new contract principles have been added. A "warranties" concept
has been adopted.50 Now, if a contract contains a warranties provision, a
party is entitled to claim damages and in some cases termination of the
contract upon the breach of such warranties even if no contractual
obligations were breached.5 Under the indemnification of losses concept,
parties to a contract may now specify that, if certain events occur, one party
will be obliged to indemnify the other party for the losses incurred as the
result such events. 52 The amount of indemnification should, however, be
53
measurable and the indemnified risk should arise out of the contract. New
injunction provisions allow a creditor to enforce a negative obligation
(obligation not to perform certain actions) if there is a real threat of a breach
of such obligation.54 Now, when a party waives a contractual right, that
waiver is binding on that party unless the waiver is prohibited by mandatory
rules.5 Option contracts and options to conclude a contract are now
available.56 Reversing the previous approach of jurisprudence, parties may
now conclude options subject to potestative conditions (i.e., conditions
entirely within the control of one of the parties). Accordingly, a principal
obligation may be entered into or performed unilaterally.
Additional changes to the code include:
* Under the new termination-fee concept, parties may unilaterally
change or repudiate an obligation upon the payment of a specific fee.s?
* The concept of a bank guarantee as a way to secure the obligations was
replaced with a concept of independent guarantee, which may be
issued not only by a credit institution, but also by any commercial
organization.58
* Another newly introduced means for securing obligations is a so-called
59
security deposit widely used in lease agreements.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

GRAZHDANSKJ KODEKS RossisKOi FEDERATS1n [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 307(Russ.).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at art.
at art.
at art.
at art.
at art.

434.1.
431.2.
431.2, para. 2.
406.1.
406.1, para 1.

GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS RossusKoi FEDERATSn1 [GK RE] (Civil Code] art. 450.1 (Russ.).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

450.1.
429.3.
310, para. 3.
368.
381.1.
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As of September 1, 2016, new legislation is in force in Russia governing
international and domestic arbitration.60 This legislation replaced the
previous law in its entirety.61

The new legislation primarily focuses on bringing the Russian arbitration
system further in line with the UNCITRAL Model Law. It accomplishes
this by, among other things, adopting a more flexible approach to the form
and contents of arbitration agreements, 62 introducing relatively clear-cut
rules on the arbitrability of different types of disputes,63 expanding the types
of disputes subject to arbitration and improving communications between
the court, arbitration tribunal, and arbitration institution.

C.

LITIGATION PROCEDURE

Among other litigation developments, courts no longer may reduce the
size of the penalty upon its discretion. Such reduction is subject to the other
party's respective claim and to proof of an explicit disproportion between the
damages and penalties.64 There are also further positive developments on
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.65
In summary, the above-mentioned changes result in a shift in choice of
law in favor of Russian legal system at least for domestic M&A transactions
taking place on the Russian market. Russia increasingly becomes compliant
to the best world practices, becoming more flexible and providing better
opportunities to the expanding demands of the market.

VIII.

Saudi Arabia

Prior to Saudi Arabia's 2005 accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), non-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)66 investors could hold only
60. Federal'nyy zakon Ob arbitrazhe v Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Federal Law On Arbitration in
the Russian Federation], SOBRANTE ZAKONODATEL'STVA RossiISKol FEDERATS[I [SZ RF]

[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2015, No. 382-FZ.
61. See generally GRAzi-iDANSKi KoDKKs RossiSKO FEDERATSL1 [GK RF] [Civil Code]
(Russ.).
62. Federal'nyy zakon Ob arbitrazhe v Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Federal Law On Arbitration in
the Russian Federation], SOBR31ANIE ZAKONODATEL'STvA RosslISKol FEDERATsir [SZ

RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2015, No. 382-FZ, art. 7.
63. Arbitrazhnyy protsessual'nyy kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii[Arbitrazh Procedural Code of
the Russian Federation],

SOBRANIE

ZAKONODAEL'STVA

RossilsKol

FFDERTrsII [SZ RF]

[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2002, No. 95-FZ, art. 225.1.
64. Gl6AZIIDANSKu KODFKS RossHsKo1 FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 333 (Russ.).
65. Federal'nyy zakon Ob arbitrazhe v Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Federal Law On Arbitration in
the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STvA RossusKol FEDERATSil [SZ

RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2015, No. 382-FZ, art. 44, para. 3.
66. See List of GCC Gulf Countries, DUB3A[FAQS.COM, (April 17, 2017) http://www.dubaifaqs
.com/list-of-gcc-countries.php (the GCC member states consist of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman).
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up to 51 percent ownership in wholesale and retail trading entities. As part
of the 2005 WTO accession, however, Saudi Arabia liberalized this
restriction and allowed non-GCC investors to hold up to 75 percent
ownership in such entities. Thus, since 2005, foreign investors seeking to
establish a presence in Saudi Arabia to engage in wholesale and retail trade
activities have been required to enter into a joint venture with a Saudi
partner who holds a minimum 25 percent ownership interest in the entity.
In September 2015, the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority
(SAGIA-the government authority responsible for evaluating and issuing
foreign investment applications and licenses) announced that foreign
investors would be permitted to establish wholly owned wholesale and retail
trade entities. At that time, SAGIA did not describe any conditions or
restrictions that would apply, instead it merely invited interested parties to
express their interest to SAGIA on a case-by-case basis. But on June 15,
2016, SAGIA released its Rules for Full Foreign Ownership of Retail and
Wholesale Operations (the Rules), which provide as follows:67
Capital Requirements: The minimum paid-up capital for a wholly foreign
owned wholesale and retail trading entity is SAR 30 million (about USD 8
million). In addition, the owner must invest at least SAR 200 million
(about USD 53 million) in the entity over the course of five years
beginning from the date of license issuance.68
Applicability: The owner of a wholly foreign owned wholesale and retail
trading entity must be of a reputable nature such that it has a local
presence in at least three international markets. In addition, only those
foreign manufacturers who wish to sell their own products in Saudi Arabia
may establish a wholly foreign owned entity. That is, a foreign investor
who wishes to engage in wholesale or retail trade of other companies'
products is still limited to the preexisting model that requires a minimum
25 percent local shareholding.69
Local Requirements: The foreign owner must manufacture a minimum of
30 percent of its products in-Kingdom.70 Further, the foreign owner must
establish an in-Kingdom logistics services and distribution hub and must
invest at least 5 percent of its sales in in-Kingdom research and
development programs.7 ' But those local requirements are waived if the
foreign owner invests an additional SAR 100 million (about USD 27
million) in the entity over the course of five years beginning from the date
of license issuance-for a total of SAR 300 million (about USD 80
2
million) over five years. 7
67. Saudi Arabia Update-July 2016, LEXOLOGY Uuly 27, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=585f003a-2711-406d-a34b-ff385b3c877e.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Saudization: Related to the local requirements, the foreign owner must
fulfill additional Saudization3 requirements. Particularly, the entity must
train at least 30 percent of its Saudi employees annually and commit to
employing Saudi employees in leadership positions over the course of the
first five years beginning from the date of license issuance. In addition,
the foreign owner must employ a sufficient ratio of Saudi Arabian
nationals in accordance with the requirements of the Ministry of Labor.74
According to public reports, only two wholly foreign owned wholesale and
retail trading entities that have been licensed and established in Saudi Arabia
as of yet-Dow Chemical Co. and 3M. The media report that high-level
talks to establish such entities for companies including Pfizer and Apple are
underway. Those companies provide examples of the types of foreign
investors that the Rules appear to be targeting at this time. It will be
interesting to see if the Saudi authorities, over time, seek to further liberalize
this sector by allowing smaller capitalized foreign investors to wholly own
retail and wholesale trading entities.
Relatedly, it is uncertain whether the Rules will remain consistent and
how the various Saudi authorities will apply and respond to the Rules.
Particularly, Saudization requirements tend to be a moving target and can
fluctuate based on several factors including global market conditions, the
domestic and regional economy, unemployment numbers, and the current
political climate and rhetoric. It will be interesting to see how foreign
investors will react to this inherent unpredictability when considering
establishing a wholly owned wholesale and retail trading entity.
Similarly, the Kingdom is currently in a strong economic liberalization
movement, which some experts have suggested is mostly motivated by
globally low oil prices and, thus, requires the Kingdom to open up more to
foreign direct investment to make up for its losses. As global oil prices
continue to stabilize and rise, it will be interesting to see if this movement
continues, stagnates, or, in the alternative, regresses as the perceived need
for foreign investment in Saudi Arabia decreases with the comfort brought
by higher-priced oil.

73. "Saudization" is a colloquial term used to refer to the government's official policy of
encouraging the employment of Saudi nationals over foreigners and is implemented using
various methods and programs. Companies are required to maintain a certain proportion of
Saudi versus non-Saudi employees based on their size and the industry in which they operate,
with large, high-paying, and high-tech companies often requiring the highest Saudization
proportions, while small businesses and companies operating in manual labor and similar fields
require lower proportions. Failure to adhere to Saudization requirements may result in denial
of government services, including non-renewal of commercial and foreign investment licenses
and employment visas for existing non-Saudi employees, as well as non-issuance of employment
visas for new employees.
74. Id.
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United States

As in past years, one need not look beyond Delaware for the most
important developments in United States M&A law during 2016. Building
on its decision in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC,7s the Delaware
Supreme Court in Singh v. Attenborough76 reiterated the principle that a
corporate board's decision to approve a merger will be subject to the lenient
"business judgment rule" standard of review if the merger was adopted by a
fully-informed, uncoerced, disinterested majority of stockholders.77 The
Delaware Supreme Court in Singh went on to state that approval of a merger
by fully-informed, uncoerced, disinterested stockholders has the further
effect of limiting judicial review to issues of "waste," with the burden of
proof on the party attacking the transaction.78 Because a determination of
waste is supported only in limited circumstances when "no person of
[ordinary] sound business judgment" could consider the change of control
fair to the stockholders,79 a scenario with little real-world likelihood if
stockholders approve the deal, Singh effectively insulates corporate boards
from liability in mergers that receive fully-informed, uncoerced,
disinterested stockholder approval.80
Singh also addressed potential aiding and abetting liability for a board's
financial adviser, a much-discussed issue since the Delaware Chancery
Court's decision in In re Rural/Metro Corporation Stockholders Litigation.81
The Court upheld the dismissal of claims against the financial advisor
because the plaintiffs had not pled facts showing that the advisor
"knowingly" misled the board. By requiring such a high standard of
scienter, the Court effectively foreclosed aiding and abetting claims against
financial advisors except in the most egregious circumstances.
The Delaware Chancery Court also extended the principles in Corwin to
the tender offer context. 82 In In re Volcano CorporationStockholder Litigation,83
the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, holding that the tendering of
shares by a majority of fully-informed, uncoerced, disinterested stockholders
in a tender offer has the same effect as the cleansing vote of a fully-informed,
84
uncoerced, disinterested stockholder majority in a merger. The Delaware
Chancery Court reasoned that the rationale behind the Corwin holding that
"a transaction approved pursuant to a statutorily required stockholder vote
[should be afforded] the benefit of the irrebuttable business judgment rule
75. Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).
76. Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151 (Del. 2016).
77. Id. at 151.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 152 (quoting Saxe v. Bracy, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962)).
80. Id.
81. In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014), affd sub nom RBC Capital Markets,
LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 862 (Del. 2015).
82. In re Volcano Corp., 143 A.3d 727 (Del Ch. 2016).
83. Id. at 727.
84. Id.
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presumption"85-applied equally in a tender offer and, in any event, that a
stockholder acceptance of a tender offer constitutes stockholder approval of
a change of control transaction under Delaware law.86
Finally, in a much discussed appraisal decision, the Delaware Chancery
Court in In re: Appraisal of Dell Inc. determined that the "fair value" of the
plaintiffs' stock was $17.62 per share rather than the $13.75 transaction
price, resulting in a 28 percent increase to the price resulting from the
auction process.87 The Court pointed to, among other things, the fact that
all bidders were financial buyers who used LBO pricing models that, in the
Chancery Court's view, value transactions below "fair value" within the
meaning of the Delaware appraisal statute.88 The Court reasoned that
"[wihat a [financial buyer] is willing to pay diverges from fair value because
of (i) the financial sponsor's need to achieve [internal rates of return] of 20%
or more to satisfy its own investors and (ii) limits on the amount of leverage
that the company can support and the sponsor can use to finance the deal."89
While Delaware case law has long recognized that the merger price is not
necessarily the same as "fair value" for purposes of the appraisal statute,
many practitioners had grown to expect that the merger price for a public
company determined by an auction process would likely approximate "fair
value." But In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. signals that financial buyers
approaching deals should factor in the possibility of an unfavorable appraisal
outcome.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 743.
Id. at 744.
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., C.A. No. 9322-VCL (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016).
DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (West 2017).
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., C.A. No. 9322-VCL at 64.
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